Bending the rules : discretionary pollution control in China by Dasgupta, Susmita et al.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1761
In  C-nina.  evirn-nnienta
Bending the Rules  In
regulators play  by [he rules,
bul  often bend them  n w,vav,
Discretionary Pollution Control  that reflectimportant
in China  environmental annd  scial
concerns  Regulators  giv'e
little or no slack to heavu
Susmita Dasgupta
dischargers  Old fac[ories  pay
Mainul Huq
more.  state-cxvned facturie,
David Wheeler
pay' higrier  rates,  anJ big
employers  get a discujnt
The World Bank
Policy Research Department

















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1761
Summary findings
Industry compliance with pollution regulations  is far  regulation, the economics  of compliance,  and regulatory
from universal, even  in North America.  In developing  discretion.  They find:
countries,  compliance  rates are often quite low,  *  Cost-sensitive plants will try to adjust emissions  to
particularly where budgets for regulation are  low or  the point where the marginal  levy equals the marginal
inspectors  are corrupt.  cost of abatement.
And strictness of enforcement  varies.  Regulators  are  * In practice, local  regulators have considerable
reluctant to impose  stiff penalties on financially  strapped  discretion in judging both  compliance  and appropriate
plants that are major employers,  and in many developing  penalties for noncompliance.  China's regulators play by
countries state-owned  plants are treated  more leniently  the rules,  but often bend them. Underreporting  and
than their private-sector counterparts.  underassessment are common  in China.  But variable
But research on  determinants of compliance  and  regulation  is systematic,  not random, and seems to reflect
enforcement  is rare, even in industrial  societies.  important  environmental and social concerns.  Old
Dasgupta,  Huq, and Wheeler use new plant-level data  factories pay  more, state-owned  factories  pay higher
for China to analyze  variations in both compliance  and  rates, and big employers  get a discount.  And regulators
enforcement,  with a focus on regulation  of water  give little or no slack to heavy dischargers.
pollution. They look at the mechanics of official
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Industry compliance with pollution regulations is far from universal, even in North
America (Magat and Viscusi,  1990; Laplante and Rilstone,  1995;  Dion, Lanoie and Laplante,
1996).  In developing countries, compliance rates are often quite low (Hettige,  Huq, Pargal
and Wheeler,  1996).  Since budget-constrained regulatory agencies cannot monitor all
facilities, some non-compliance  is attributable to optimizing behavior:  Firms may choose to
remain non-compliant if the incremental  cost of moving to compliance is greater than the
expected loss associated with discovery  and payment of penalties.  Where  inspectors are
scarce or the courts lenient,  non-compliance may be quite common (Afsah, Laplante and
Makarim,  1996).  In addition, of course, corruption of inspectors may play a significant role
in some countries.
Strictness of enforcement can also vary substantially  across plants.  In the US, for
example, numerous  press accounts and case studies have identified political pressure as a
source of variation in local enforcement  of national regulations (Wheeler,  1991).
Environmental regulators have proven quite reluctant to impose stiff penalties on financially-
strapped plants which are major employers (Deily and Gray,  1991).  In many developing
countries, state-owIned  factories seem to have been treated more leniently than their private-
sector counterparts  (CETESB,  1994; Pargal and Wheeler,  1996; Huq, Hartman and Wheeler,
1996).
Although anecdotes  are plentiful, systematic research on determinants of compliance
and enforcement  is rare even in industrial societies because the necessary information isseldom provided  by regulatory  agencies.'  To our knowledge, no such studies have been done
for developing countries.  In this paper, we use new plant-level data provided by China's
National Environmental  Protection Agency (NEPA) and the Tianjin Environmental
Protection Bureau (TEPB) for an analysis of variations in both compliance and enforcement.
These data provide a unique opportunity for regulatory analysis in a developing country,
because NEPA has operated and documented  a country-wide emissions charge system for
over ten years.  We focus on regulation of water pollution because the appropriate data are
more plentiful  in the factory sample available to us.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review China's system for
,enforcing industrial pollution regulations.  Section 3 develops models for the analysis of
compliance and enforcement,  while Section 4 introduces the data.  We discuss the
econometric results in Section 5 and provide a summary  and conclusions  in Section 6.
2.  China's Pollution Levy
In China's regulatory system, emissions which exceed official standards  are not
treated as legal violations.  Rather, Article 18 of China's Environmental Protection Law
specifies that "in cases where the discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit set by the state, a
compensation fee shall be charged according to the quantities and concentration of the
pollutants released."  This compensation  fee, or levy, has been implemented nationally since
1982.  Almost all of China's counties and cities are now operating the levy system, and
approximately  300,000 factories have been charged for their emissions  (NEPA, 1994).
1 In many countries,  such records are protected by law.  Even in the U.S., the Environmental  Protection
Agency has only recently announced plans to publish records of inspections, violations and emissions at the
plant level.
2The water pollution levy is not a true Pigovian charge; it is assessed on emissions
which exceed established discharge standards for pollutant concentration in waste water.
Chinese discharge standards vary across pollutants, industrial sectors, and "water
environment function areas" which distinguish receiving waters  by the quality of intended
use.  They also vary by age of plant, with more lenient standards for facilities established
prior to 1979.  With NEPA's permission,  local areas can impose stricter standards and higher
levy rates if they think it appropriate.  Pollutant-specific  levies are calculated by multiplying
three elements together: a unit fee; the volume of waste water discharged;  and the ratio of
effluent concentration to the standard concentration.2  For plants with multiple pollutants, the
maximum concentration ratio is used for levy assessment.  Unit fees escalate with discharge
volume.3
3.  Model Specification
3.1 The Economics  of Compliance
Non-compliant  factories simply have to pay the levy, so pollution control is largely an
economic issue for Chinese managers. In the case of a single pollutant, the total levy for the
jth non-compliant plant-  is given by the formula:4
2 The termsr  'intiuent-i.anaviaulliuen'  -^rer  to the waste  stream before and after end-of-pipe abatement.
3For more discussion of the levy and its impact on pollution,  see Florig and Spofford (1994) and Wang and
Wheeler (1996).
4  Model variable definitions  are summarized  in Table 1.
3(3. 1) Lj=j  'Wj 
Ils
where  Lj = Expected total levy payment
pj = Levy rate
= Effluent concentration
=s  = Concentration  standard
Wj = Waste water volume
Recent econometric work on factory-level abatement costs in China (Dasgupta, Huq
and Wheeler,  1996) suggests the following model for the case of a single pollutant:
(3.2) Aj =y  l  -
where  O<yl<l'Y2 >  0
and  Aj  Total abatement cost
g0j  =  Influent concentration
,u;  =  Effluent concentration.
Zj  =  A vector of plant characteristics  which affect costs
(sector, age, scale, ownership,  etc.)
At the plant level, y, is significantly less than unity (i.e.,  abatement is subject to scale
economies).  While total abatement cost rises less-than-proportionately  with scale of waste
water treatment, marginal abatement cost increases with percent reduction in pollutant
concentration from influent to effluent. Total pollution-related cost is therefore  given by:
(3.3)  Cj = Lj + A 1 j = p.j  i±Wj + yowjl{[  {  -I  l}HZ  jm
Cost minimization implies choosing an effluent concentration  pt such that
(3.4)  '=  0
j
4Cost-minimizing managers in regulated private firms and township-village enterprises
will reduce pollution to the point where the expected levy rate is equal to the marginal cost of
abatement.  Managers in state-owned enterprises  (SOEs) with hard budget constraints should
exhibit similar behavior; their response to pollution charges may be less elastic where soft
budget constraints persist.  For a plant j which adjusts so as to minimize pollution-related
costs, optimal effluent concentration  is given by the solution to (3.4):
1  y I-1 Y2  1  1  M  pm
(3.5  ~  =yoy)12+]W7Y2+1  Y2J+1  Y2+1p'Y2+1 r]7Jz2+1 (3.5)  lj=(Y 0G  2)  j  WJ  Foj  1sj  PJ  lm
m=l
A cost-minimizing plant will be compliant if  .j*.< tij.  By conventional reasoning,
p  * should never be less than [tj because the levy is zero for discharges whose effluent
concentration is below the standard.  However,  a number of factors may lead some plants to
perform better than the standard requires. These include the market value of environmental
reputation (particularly for large enterprises) and pressure from local communities  (Pargal
and Wheeler,  1996; Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler,  1996; Wheeler and Afsah,  1996).
In equation (3.5), we have the following  expectations about the impact of plant-level
variables on effluent concentration and compliance:
1.  Discharge Volume  (WVj):  Since waste water treatment  is subject to very significant scale
economies, optimal effluent concentration will fall as discharge volume increases, and the
probability of compliance will increase.
2.  Influent Intensity  (-ji0): Optimal effluent  concentration increases less-than-
proportionately with influent concentration  (0 < y2/(y2+1)  < 1); the probability of
compliance will decrease as influent concentration rises.
53.  Concentration Standard (ppjg):  As the standard is tightened,  more abatement will be
warranted to avoid higher levies.  The impact on optimal effluent concentration is
inversely related to the abatement cost elasticity (Y2),  since managers faced with rapidly-
escalating abatement costs will be more willing to pay additional fines.  By the same
reasoning, the probability of compliance will decrease as  'js increases.
4.  Pollution  levy rate (pj):  Increases in the levy will reduce optimal effluent concentration
and increase the probability of compliance.
5.  Plant Scale:  Abatement,  process modification and production are joint activities.  In
larger plants, the fixed costs associated with engineering skills and other relevant inputs
can be distributed across a larger number of activities.  This should lower the cost of
pollution reduction, through its impact on process modification  and end-of-pipe
abatement.  We therefore expect optimal effluent concentration to fall (and the probability
of compliance to rise) with increasing plant scale.  We use total employment  as our proxy
for scale.
6.  Age:  Pollution control has been increasingly  embodied in new process technologies.  In
addition, installation of end-of-pipe abatement equipment during plant construction is
cheaper than retrofitting.  With a steady increase in regulatory  pressure since  1980, we
expect newer plants in China to exhibit better environmental  performance.  Probability of
compliance should therefore be negatively affected  by age of plant.
7.  Ownership:  Even after age and scale are accounted for, we expect public ownership to
increase pollution intensity and reduce the probability of compliance.  State-owned
enterprises (SOEs)  are likely to be less efficient, creating more waste residuals and
6pollution than their private counterparts.  Soft budget constraints  for many SOEs should
also reduce their managers'  responsiveness to pollution charges.
3.2  The Political Economy  of Regulation
Relying on anecdotal evidence, critics of China's pollution control system have
asserted that enforcement of the levy system is relatively arbitrary.  (Qu, 1991).  Personal ties
between regulators and plant managers and other forms of favoritism are commonly cited.  To
our knowledge, however, the sources of variation in regulatory enforcement have not been
analyzed systematically.  As we noted in the introduction, variation in enforcement may
reflect social welfare concerns  as well as personal ties.
In practice, regulators have considerable discretion in two dimensions of regulation:
The formal identification of factories as non-compliant  (and therefore subject to the levy);
and the strictness of their enforcement response (measured by the effective levy rate which is
applied to excess discharges).  For analytical purposes, we specify two adjustment equations
which relate plant characteristics to officially-recognized  effluent concentration and the
effective levy rate.
M=1
(3.7) li J=  a~  oWj-.  Wn H  Z m-.
(3.7)  pOj=  POWT,  z1  - Poi
The variables in these-two adjustment equations include:
1.  Discharge-Volume  (W1):  Although Chinese regulations focus on concentration
standards, actual pollution damage is also a subject of concern.  The levy system
7recognizes this problem by applying higher rates to large dischargers.  It is also likely that
Chinese regulators pay closer attention to such plants. We might therefore expect
discharge volume to have a.  positive effect on the regulators'  identification of non-
compliance, as well as on the levy rate.
2.  Plant Scale:  Given the political importance of employment,  Chinese regulators may well
be more lenient toward facilities which are large employers.
3.  Age:  Plants constructed prior to 1979 face laxer regulatory standards than newer
facilities.  Even so, plant managers could be expected to invoke 'grandfathering'
arguments when confronted by regulators with evidence of non-compliance.  If age has
any impact on regulator discretion,  we would expect it to be toward lenience  in both
identification of non-compliance  and assessment of the levy.
4.  Ownership:  In mixed economies, it has often proven difficult for government regulators
to punish violations by state-owned enterprises.  Political and bureaucratic factors seem
to prevent effective supervision of one government  agenqcy  by another.  If China's
experience is similar, we would expect laxer enforcement  for its SOEs.  However, they
might well be given extra scrutiny for non-compliance  even if enforcement is more
difficult.
3.3  Compliance Equation Specification
In our treatment of compliance, we distinguish between actual plant-level emissions
intensity (p) and officially-recognized  intensity (u).  Our compliance equation incorporates
8two sets of factors: economic calculations and regulator discretion.  Substituting (3.5) into
(3.6) we obtain:
1___  |a  _+Y__  Y2  1  am+  O_m
(3.8)  jLI=aO@O  22  )2  Y2+ 1 7-2+ 1 72+1 H  Zj.m
Information problems have forced us to simplify (3.8) for econometric estimation.
Our data base does not include observations on the local standards  (IAsj)  faced by individual
factories.  In addition, we have to exclude the pollution levy-rate (pj) because we use a non-
zero levy as our indicator of non-compliance.5 To control for these factors,  we introduce
sector dummy variables (Sin) in (3.10).  They proxy the effects of the following composite
term in (3.8):
1
(3.9)  Psi  2
pj
Following  (3.9), we expect effluent concentration to be higher in sectors with high
concentration standards relative to their unit levy rates.  The impact of the standard/levy ratio
on effluent concentration and compliance will vary inversely with abatement cost elasticity.
After substitution of dummy variables, the effluent concentration equation becomes:
I  +7-1 IL)  M~  ja+-'~
( 1
°Y 2+1  y  ) 2+1  nM  Zj,m  n  2+I N-1  OnSn (3. 10)  =. 1 - 0 (y  2 )2  in=i  in  fn=i
The associated log-log form is:
5Technical issues of probit estimnation are discussed later in  this section.
9(3.1  lo  j  ={log ao  +  log(zO72)}+{w+  logWi+  t-g2
M  Em  ~~~N-1
m-l  + m +  +l  logZmj  + XO,nSjn
With composite parameters r, this becomes:
M  N-1
(3.12)  log ij =,no +i  lwIog W +n,  log go  +  Y-lr7zmllogZj +  Xi'Z  S. J  g  i~~  M- t I  n=1  Sn?  in
Regardless of its true compliance status, a factory is judged compliant if ui < ,s.
Since we have no observations  on jt,, the effluent standard for each plant, we cannot observe
officially-recognized.compliance  directly.. However, we know that all levy-paying plants are
recognized as non-compliant by NEPA and the TEPB. We therefore use our data set to
construct a binary dependent variable Cj,  whose value is 1 for factories which pay no levy
and 0 otherwise. Assuming that log 4a  is normally distributed6, the. probability of compliance
(log a s log jQ)  can be calculated from the cumulative norrnal probability distribution.  The
parameters of (3.12) can be estimated by probit, with Cj = 1 when the factory is officially
compliant and zero.  otherwise.  As we noted previously, our use of the pollution levy for
identifying non-compliant factories excludes the use of factory-specific  levy rates on the
righthand side of the estimating equation.7
In (3.12), Zmj includes measures of plant age, scale (employment) and state ownership
(a dummy variable whose value is one for SOEs).  Our expectations about the signs of
estimated paraneters in-the.compliance  equation are summarized in Table 2.
6 Since plant-level pollution intensities are highly skewed, the log-log specification of (3.12) has the advantage
of imposing quasi-nornality  in the underlying error distribution.
7 Given the match between left- and righthand zeros, the probit estimator obtains a spurious  'perfect fit' if the
levy is included as an explanatory variable.
103.4 Enforcement Equation
When formula (3.1)  is actually applied by Chinese regulators, the effective levy rate
is a function of sector, discharge volume, and the adjusted unit levy rate (from (3.7)):
N-1 '~%Sj,J'~N-1i 
(3.13)5j = pLj  H.l  et  W  0 0po  W,'°  HI  et  }  JZ,I
In=l  n=l  t-
The effective  levy is given by:
(3.14)L. = p.  -W.  =P  Pwz  m
'  J  is  J  O0OJp~s  =  "?--  JM
For multiple pollutants, the levy is based on the pollutant with the maximum ratio of effluent
concentration to the regulatory  standard.  We specify the associated estimating equation in
log-log form:
log  L  log PP0 O  +0 log{max  }+ {P  ++  +  1} logW1
(3.15)s
N-1  M
+  6  S.  +  E  7t  Z.  +£  .
n  n  Jn  m=1  m  Jm  j
With composite parameters co this becomes:
[  PJ]  N-1
logLj =coo  +  log{max  + coW log Wj  _ 1nS  jn
(3.16)
M
+  z.  +  Z  .
m=l m  JM  j
where ei is a random error term and Zj includes measures of age, scale and ownership.  Since
the maximum concentration/standard  ratio is part of the levy formula, its inclusion in (3.16)
is particularly  importunt.  We use national sectoral standards as our proxies for values of k5.
11No levy is paid by factories whose officially-recognized  effluent concentrations  are
all equal to or below the relevant standards.  Since this is true for some plants in our sample,
the dependent variable is left-censored at zero but takes on a broad range of positive values.
We therefore estimate the parameters of (3.16) using tobit.  Table 3 summarizes our prior
predictions on signs.
124.  Data
For this analysis, NEPA and the TEPB have provided us with 1993 data for 328
factories  scattered across China's urban/industrial  areas.8 The sample has broad sectoral
coverage (Table 4). Not surprisingly,  it has very heavy public-sector representation:  291
plants are state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs), 20 are collectives, and 9 are joint ventures or
wholly-owned by foreign firms.9 The sample plants appear to be older and larger than
average,  but nonetheless exhibit wide variation in age, scale, pollution intensity and
abatemeni cost.  Years of operation  vary from 3 to 93,  with the median at 35.  The majority
of plants were established prior to  1979, and therefore face lower emissions  standards then
newer facilities.  Employment varies from 139 to 37,000; the median plant has 1781
employees.
Some plants report significant abatement activity and effluent concentrations  below
the designated emission standards, while others show no sign of abatement effort, despite
extremely  high levels of influent concentration.  Within the sample,  influent COD
concentrations  can be as high as 100,000 mg/l, while effluent  concentrations are as high as
22,800 mg/I.1 0 Abatement costs also vary substantially:  The highest cost incurred by a plant
in the sample is RMB 68.75 million, but the median is only RMB 0.3 million.  The incidence
of levies suggests that the environmental  performance  of SOEs follows the pattern observed
elsewhere  in Asia (Pargal and Wheeler,  1996;  Hartman, Huq and Wheeler,  1996): 73%  of
8 We believe this to be an approximately random  sample from NEPA's database of 3000 top polluters.  Of
course, these plants are not a random  sample of Chinese industrial  facilities.  As a group, they are  likely to have
higher-than  average pollution intensity.  Although this may affect average compliance  status, we have no
reason to believe that it will bias our estimates of incremental relationships.
9In the sample of 328 plants,  320 are identifiable  by ownership class.
10 These maximum values contrast with official COD concentration  standards in the range of 100-200 mg/l.
13SOEs pay levies, compared with 52% of non-SOEs.  Both the incidence of levy payments
and the average levy differ substantially across sectors  (Table 4).
5.  Econometric Results
5.1  Probit Results:  Determinants of Compliance
Table 5 presents the full set of probit results for the compliance equation (based on
3.12); variables  are successively  deleted from the full specification  until significant factors
remain.  Total sample size is constrained by data availability, particularly for the influent
intensities (inclusion of the latter reduces the estimation sample size from 276 to  107).  The
results confirm our prior expectations in cases where the predicted signs are unambiguous
(see Table 2):  SOEs are significantly  less likely to be compliant than plants in other
ownership categories;  large plants (measured by employment)  are significantly more likely to
be in compliance.  Where prior expectations  were ambiguous, our results are mixed.  Older
plants are significantly less likely to be in compliance,  suggesting that the economic impact
of age on abatement cost outweighs the effect of laxer regulations and any inclination toward
leniency on the part of regulators.  On the other hand, the results for discharge volume
suggest that large polluters face compliance-related  scrutiny  which outweighs the abatement
cost advantage of scale.  Plants with large waste water discharges are significantly less likely
to be judged compliant.
In the initial regression, we incorporate influent intensity  measures for all three major
pollutants in the data set (total  suspended solids (TSS); chemical oxygen demand (COD);
biological oxygen demand (BOD)).  There are clearly collinearity problems; when only BOD
intensity is included, its estimated parameter has the expected sign but a low significance
14level.  The large standard error makes the point estimate [y2/(Y2+I)  -.25] consistent with a
wide range of abatement cost elasticities  (y2)4  Dummy variables are included for sectors
which are heavily represented in the tegression subsample. Their collective insignificance
suggests that sectoral standards and'levies vary together [i.e., j./p remains approximately
constant in (3.9)].
5.2  Tobit Results:  Determinants of Enforcement
Our tobit results for equation (3.16) are reported in Table 6. In this case,
heteroskedasticity across observationls  can be a source of serious estimation error.  Maddala
and Nelson (1975)  have shown that uncorrected estimates are inconsistent. Although our log-
log specification is a common expedient for avoiding heteroskedasticity,  Fishe, et. al. (1979)
have shown that the log transformation does not solve'the problem in tobit models.  We have
therefore estimated the final form of our tobit equation with and without a heteroskedasticity
correction.  The corrected equation is estimated by maximum likelihood,' under the
assumption that error variance is a function of output. 'The results are strongly consistent
with the existence of heteroskedasticity  [t(a)  =  8.928] arid confirm the significance of output
as the control variable (t(Output) = 2269).  However, we find that in this case the parameter
estimates in the corrected  equation are nearly, identical to those in the uncorrected  equation.
Deletion of insignificant variables again leaas us to arop the sector dummies from the
final equation.  Our results for the two variables  in the levy formula,conform to prior
expectations:  The elasticity for the mnaximu'm' concentration/standard  ratio is positive and not
significantly different from one; the waste water discharge elasticity is positive and
significantly greater than one.  Among the plant characteristics,  the effect of facility scale isalso as we expected:  Large employers are assessed at much lower rates than other plants.
However, our results contain two major surprises:  Older firms are assessed at significantly
higher rates, and SOEs at far higher rates than other facilities.  Although these results are
contrary to our expectations,  they are consistent with the estimates for the same variables in
the compliance  equation.  In China,  state-owned enterprises  are apparently subject to more
rigorous enforcement than collectives and factories with private shareholders. I  This is an
important reversal of previous findings for mixed Asian economies (Pargal and Wheeler,
1996; Huq, Hartman  and Wheeler,  1996, Hettige, Huq, Pargal and Wheeler,  1996).
6. Summary and Conclusions'
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of plant-level compliance  and
enforcement in China's water pollution levy system.  Our study incorporates three factors:
1.  The mechanics of official  regulation:  A plant is judged non-compliant if its officially-
reported waste water discharge contains at least one pollutant whose concentration  is
above the regulatory standard.  For non-compliant  plants, the official levy incorporates
several factors:  A unit levy rate which varies by sector and, in some cases, by locality;  a
standard (upward) adjustment of the unit rate as discharge volume increases; and
multiplication of the adjustment rate by (a) the plant's maximum effluent
concentration/standard  ratio and (b) the volume of waste water discharge.
2.  The economics  of compliance:  Cost-sensitive plants will attempt to adjust emissions to
the point where the marginal levy is equal to the marginal cost of abatement.
Representation  of private facilities in the subsample  is too sparse for meaningful separation of collective and
private-sector effects.
163.  Regulators' discretion: In practice, local  regulators have considerable  discretion in
judging both compliance and appropriate penalties for non-compliance.
Our results suggest that all three factors play significant roles in compliance and
enforcement.  The compliance results highlight the significance of economic factors.  As
expected,  compliance probability is negatively related to state ownership and age, positively
related to plant scale.  However,  our results also suggest that regulators'  discretion has a
strong effect on outcomes.  Abatement economics imply higher rates of compliance for large
dischargers,  because China regulates effluent concentration  and marginal costs are lower in
large abatement facilities.12  However, waste stream volume has a large negative impact on
reported compliance,  suggesting that regulators  give little or no slack to large dischargers.
Our enforcement results indicate that assessment of the levy is typically consistent
with theform dictated by regulatory statutes. The effective  levy rate goes up sharply with
discharge volume, as mandated, and the levy-elasticity of plant-specific maximum
concentration/  standard ratios is not significantly different from one.  However, the results
also suggest that the substance of levy assessment reflects a large measure of regulator
discretion:  Old factories pay more,  state-owned factories pay higher rates, and big employers
get a discount.
We conclude that China's regulators play by the rules; but frequently bend them.
Compliant factories would be unlikely to accept non-compliant status, so the estimated
impact of plant characJ  ristics on reported  compliance  and -enforcement suggests that under-
reporting and under-assessment  are common in China.  In this paper, we have found that
12  See Dasgupta,  Huq and Wheeler (1996) for evidence on abatement costs.
17variable regulation is systezpatic, not random, and that it seems to reflect important
environmental 'and social concerms.
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20Table 1:  Variable Definitions
pj  =  Levy rate
Lj  =  Expected total levy payment
pj  =  Effective levy rate
Lj  =  Actual total levy payment
Wj  =  Waste water volume
Aj  =  Total abatement cost
Cj  =  Total pollution-related  cost
p.,  =  Effluent concentration
p,j  =  Officially-recognized  effluent concentration
p,  =  Concentration  standard
p0j  =  Influent conccntration
Zj  =  A vector of plant characteristics  which affect costs
(sector, age, scale, ownership, etc.)
Table 2:  Predicted Signs,  Compliance Equation
Variable  Predicted  Regulators'  Enterprise
Full Sign  Discretion  Costs
Discharge Volume  (Wj)  - +
Influent Concentration  (poj)  0
Scale (Employment)  (Z,)  +  +  +
Age (Z 2)  +
SOE  (Z3)  - or 0
Sectors  (Z4 ... ZM)  Variable  Variable  Variable
Table 3:  Predicted Signs, Enforcement Equation
Variable  Predicted  Partial  Partial
Full Sign  ,Effects  Effects
Discharge  Volume (Wj) . + (>)  Py>o  9>0
Influent Concentrati6n -Ratio (gi'o)  + ((=)
Scale (Employment) (Z-)  -
Age (Z2)
SOE (Z3)
Sectors (Z4 ... ZM)  Variable
21Table 4:  Levy Incidence Across Sample Industry Sectors
Total Number of  Proportion Paying  Mean *
Sector  Plants  Levy  Levy (10,000 RMB
yuan)
Food  46  0.80  39.95
Beverages  42  0.69  21.05
Textile  63  0.68  16.94
Leather  25  0.56  10.04
Pulp and Paper  26  0.85  146.36
Power  22  0.73  54.14
Petroleum  RefLn.ing  9  0.78  119.57
Chemicals  41  0.78  83.25
Pharmaceuticals  11  1.00  28.44
Plastic  3  1.00  60.71
Cement  14  0.36  11.86
Iron and Steel  7  0.71  7.49
Others  19  0.37  21.68
* Calculated on the basis of levy-paying plants only.
22Table 5:  Probit Estimates (Compliance Equation)
Dependent Variable:  Compliance Status (1  if Compliant)
Variable Descriptions:
LDISCHARGE  (W):  Log (amount of waste water discharged)
LTSSINF  (koT):  Log (TSS concentration in the influent)
LCODINF  (jtoc):  Log (COD concentration in the influent)
LBODINF  (kiOB):  Log (BOD concentration  in the influent)
LAGE  (Zi):  Log (age of the plant)
SOE  (Z2):  Dummy variable = 1 if the plant is state owned
=  0  otherwise
LEMP (Z3):  Log (number of employees)
Model 1  Model 2  Model  3  Model  4
Coefficient  Z  Coefficient  Z  Coefficient  Z  Coefficien  Z
._________________  t
Intercept  2.609  1.206  1.481  0.771  1.524  0.804  -0.598  -0.811
LDISCHARGE  -0.419**  -2.626  -0.427**  -3.009  -0.428**  -3.043  -0.242* :  -3.780
LTSSINF  -0.021  -0.387  -0.025  -0.475
LCODINF  0.011  0.199  0.011  0.196
LBODINF  -0.258  -1.385  -0.247  -1.462  -0.237  -1.439
LAGE  -0.597**  -2.427  -0.611**  -2.573  -0.611**  -2.600  -0.196*  -1.660
SOE  -1.948**  -3.340  -1.769**  -3.320  -1.767**  -3.387  -0.548**  -2.184
LEMP  0.296  1.016  0.445*  1.677  0.432*  1.636  0.308**  2.505
Paper  -0.227  -0.294  .
Food  0.172  0.255
Textiles  0.023  0.050
Petroleum  1.552  1.401
Cement  0.589  0.455
No. of obs.  107  _  107  _  107  276
Chi sq  30.82  28.39  28.03  21.88
Probability  0.002  0.0002  0.00  0.00
*  Significant  at 10%
**  Significant  at 5%
23Table 6: Tobit Estimates
Dependent Variable:  Log [Effective Levy]
Variable Descriptions:
LCONCSTD (max  -):  Log {max (concentration of pollutant i in the effluent/
's
concentration  standard for i)}
where i= BOD, COD and TSS.
LDISCHARGE  (W):  Log (amount of waste water discharged)
LTSSINF  (hOT):  Log (TSS concentration in the influent)
LCODINF  (Itoc):  Log (COD concentration  in the influent)
LBODINF  (kOB):  Log (BOD concentration  in the influent)
LAGE  (Z1):  Log (age of the plant)
SOE  (Z2):  Dummy variable = 1 if the plant is state owned
=  0  otherwise
LEMP  (Z3):  Log (number of employees)
a:  Test statistic for heteroskedasticity
Output:  Value of output in millions of RMB Yuan
Model  1  Model  2  | Model 3
Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  z
Intercept  -2.474  -0.413  1.283  0.235  0.754  0.154
LCONCSTD  0.850*  1.717  0.785*  1.659  0.758  0.879
LDISCHARGE  2.621 *  *  5.792  2.502**  6.212  2.352**  4.567
LAGE  1.565**  2.005  1.500**  1.987  1.289*  1.681
SOE  7.893**  3.825  8.050**  3.917  7.808**  3.859
LEMP  -1.961**  -2.264  -2.375**  -3.012  -2.060**  -
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  2 .3 8 0
Paper  -1.123  -0.647  _
Food  -0.841  -0.447
Textile  0.762  0.588
Petrol  -4.740  -1.419
Cement  -2.110  -0.444
a  ___________  4.895**  8.928
Output  0.0003**  2.269
No. of obs.  133  133  133
Chi sq  55.90  52.72
Probability  0.00  0.00
*  Significant  at 10%
**  Significant  at 5%
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